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Abstract. The effectiveness of public warning systems (PWS) can be challenged
by federal structures as the failure of the first nationwide German “Warntag”
(Warning Day) showed. By designing PWS to address specific challenges of
federal systems, the effectiveness of public warning might be improved. In this
paper, we derive design principles for PWS which aim to address these specific
challenges. Based on a thorough literature review, challenges regarding
responsibility, coordination, and interoperability, as well as functional and
technical requirements for PWS in federal systems were identified. By applying
a design-oriented research approach, 16 design principles in the categories
strategy and governance, standards and templates, and technology are articulated.
The research provides guidance for responsible authorities in federal systems for
the implementation or evaluation of public warning systems.
Keywords: public warning system, public warning, federalism, design
principles, design science

1

Introduction

In 2020, public warning received public attention in Germany when the first nationwide
“Warntag” (Warning Day) was declared a failure by the Ministry of Interior [1]. One
of the reasons was that the warning apps NINA and KATWARN pushed warning
messages delayed or not at all, as warning messages were accidentally triggered
simultaneously on the federal, state, and local level [2]. As public warning systems
(PWS) and administrative and governance structures are directly linked to each other,
state structures can challenge the effectiveness of PWS [3]. For example, the German
PWS is regarded as highly influenced by the federal character of the civil protection
responsibility [3, 4]. Every citizen must be entitled to receive a warning of equal quality
if they are potentially affected by an emergency. From a federal perspective, this means
an increased need for guidelines to ensure that the same quality of warning is delivered
throughout the federal system [5].
This paper addresses these challenges of public warning in a federal administrative
system by the development of design principles for public warning systems in federal
administrative systems. The design principles serve the purpose of guiding through the
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implementation of a new PWS. To meet the research goal appropriately, this paper
follows a design-oriented research approach proposed by Österle et al. [6].
The following section of this paper introduces the research background and relevant
concepts regarding public warning, including the means of public warning, challenges
for public warning in a federal system, and the requirements for public warning. In the
next section, the paper's overall research design to achieve the research goal is
explained. Afterward, design principles derived from prioritized requirements are
presented as the results of the research and applied to the German case. Finally, the
results are discussed, including the study’s limitations and implications for research and
practice.

2

Research Background

2.1

Public Warning

Public warning is “the provision of timely and effective information, through identified
institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce
their risk and prepare for effective response” [7]. To obtain relevant information in risk
situations, four types of communication can be classified [8]: (1) from citizen to
authorities, (2) among authorities, (3) from authorities to citizens, and (4) among
citizens. This paper focuses on the third type of communication, which is achieved by
PWS [8], through which authorities provide the citizens with relevant emergencyrelated information as well as suggested actions to be protected in risk situations [8].
Means of informing, alerting, and warning the population have changed over the
years. However, the traditional warning system sirens are still in use since they are
recognized as a “universal language” for an emergency and therefore make people
aware of an occurring emergency [9, 10]. However, sirens have limited capabilities to
provide the population with more information about the emergency and could fail to
operate due to their outside outdoor location [9]. Through the information era, people
impose high demands in the information flow about events before acting, as they are
used to being consistently provided with sufficient information [3]. Established and
new media, like radios, warning-apps, or TV broadcasts, can warn the population and
simultaneously advise the necessary action in time [10].
Means of informing, alerting, and warning the population have changed over the last
couple of years. The traditional warning system, a siren is still in usage, since it is
recognized as a “universal language” for an emergency and therefore makes people
aware of an occurring emergency [9, 19]. However, the siren is limited in its
capabilities, as it is not capable of notifying the population with more information about
the emergency and due to its outside location, could fail to operate [9]. Additionally,
through the information era, people impose high demands in the information flow about
events before acting, as they are used to constantly being provided with sufficient
information [3]. New media, like radios, warning-apps, or TV broadcast can warn the
population and simultaneously advice the required action in time [10].

2.2

Public Warning and Federalism

The nature of a public warning system is closely related to the administration and
governance structures of the country in which it is applied [3]. A state’s complex and
often contradictory social and administrative relationships shape and influence its
actions and responses to disasters [11]. Therefore, managing risk in multilevel systems
is strongly influenced by policy decisions and institutions on multiple administrative
levels.
As they differ in administrative and governance structures, each federal
administrative system faces its own administrative and governance challenges,
influencing the adopted solutions for public warning significantly [3]. In the case of
multilevel systems, complexity increases, and challenges regarding responsibility [12,
13], coordination [12, 14, 15] and interoperability [3, 15, 16] occur. In the case of
multilevel systems, complexity increases. The literature review revealed responsibility
[12, 13], coordination [12, 14, 15], and interoperability [3, 15, 16] as the main
challenges of public warning in federal systems.
Responsibility. In a multilevel system, responsibilities are usually delegated among
different federal and state departments, and critical conflicts and gaps can occur within
these relationships [15]. In multilevel systems, clear responsibilities, especially for
warning system implementation, need to be defined [13].
Coordination. In a multilevel system, coordination ensures that all levels of the system
work together in a synchronized manner. This is one of the most prevailed challenges
of public warning in multilevel systems and inadequate coordination between different
levels is a significant barrier for the functioning of warning systems [13].
Interoperability. Another challenge related to public warning in a federal system is
interoperability. Barriers to the interoperability of public warning systems are higher
when civil protection is decentralized [3]. The literature describes different perspectives
and levels of interoperability. In contrast, some authors address interoperability in
regards to the need for interoperable communication systems [15], and others stress the
importance of interoperability of neighboring countries [9] and Europe-wide
interoperability of public warning and alert systems [17].
There are also distinct advantages concerning public warning in federal systems.
Federal structures and the resulting necessity to involve multiple actors in public
warning processes can lead to a constructive competition of ideas, and productive
knowledge exchange among institutions [14]. A positive outcome of complex
governance networks is that actors from multiple levels are urged to jointly reach
decisions on parallel activities or coordinative measures, which might facilitate
common standards in civil protection [14].

3

Research Design

To meet our research goal, we follow the design-oriented research approach by Österle
et al. [6]. Design-oriented research explicitly focuses on solving problems by

developing IT artifacts in four phases. In the first phase, Analysis, the research problem
is identified, and the methods to be applied for solving the problem are planned. In the
following phase, Design, the actual development of the artifact is conducted, which is
critically tested in the third phase—the Evaluation. Lastly, the results of the research
are disseminated during the fourth phase, Diffusion.
For the Analysis, we made practical and scientific considerations and further
investigated the areas of public warning and federalism. As a result of this, we
uncovered several competing characteristics of warning systems and federal structures
underlining the relevance of our investigations, which finally led to the formulation of
our research goal. To address this goal, we firstly derived requirements for public
warning systems in federal systems by conducting a literature review and an expert
interview.
The literature review was conducted according to Webster and Watson [18]. The
literature consisted of relevant articles from the databases Web of Science and Scopus
between 2010 to 2020. A total number of 21 academic sources were considered relevant
to the previously introduced problem. Additionally, a manual search of the titles in all
volumes and issues between 2010 and 2020 of the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis
Management and the Journal of Emergency Management and Homeland Security was
conducted, which resulted in two additional relevant academic sources. Finally, the
sources identified in the first two steps were used for backward and forward research,
which added another five sources to the literature review.
The literature review resulted in a set of relevant academic sources that covered
functional as well as technical requirements for PWS in general [18], as well as specific
requirements that address the previously identified challenges of responsibility,
coordination, and interoperability of public warning for federal administrative systems.
Requirements from all sources were synthesized and evaluated regarding their
applicability to the challenges of federalism. Applicable requirements were categorized
in line with the following statement by Párraga Niebla [3, p. 231]: “public warning is
effective if the following conditions are met: 1) the citizens at risk receive, notice,
understand and trust warning messages on time; 2) the citizens at risk are prepared to
act, i.e., are sufficiently familiar with warning procedures and trained to act upon”. As
the latter is not within the scope of PWS, applicable requirements were categorized
according to the first part of the statement. The statement was chosen as a framework
as the paper ultimately aims to support the effectiveness of public warning, which is
what Párraga Niebla [3] refers to.
To ensure the applicability and completeness of the requirements determined in the
literature review, we conducted one expert interview with a focus on public warning in
federal states. The interviewee is employed in the middle management of an agency for
civil protection in a federal administration. The interview lasted 73 minutes, was
recorded, and then transcribed. We analyzed the interview according to the specificities
of public warning systems in federal states, corresponding requirements, and our design
principles. Together with further insights from documents of other organizations
involved in civil protection and hazard management, we obtained our final set of
requirements. Based on these requirements, we proceeded with the development of our
design principles. Design principles are artifacts that apply to a class of problems and

go beyond a classical instantiation [19]. An iterative and incremental approach was
chosen to derive the design principles. The authors took turns in developing first drafts
and reviewing the other authors’ work. In total, three iterations were carried out until
the set of principles was finished. The IT artifact was developed argumentatively.
Consequently, we created our artifact to offer guidelines for introducing or evaluating
PWS in federal systems.
The preliminary Evaluation of the design principles was two-fold: First, we
conducted a feature comparison [20] against the requirements a PWS in federal systems
should meet. Second, we tested their applicability exemplary for the German case.
We already started with the Diffusion of our findings with a presentation in front of
seven academic professionals and a group of 24 students. We are planning to further
disseminate our work on the 16. Internationale Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik.

4

Requirements

4.1

Literature Review

The literature review revealed applicable requirements in three out of the four
conditions necessary to ensure effective public warning as referred to in the statement
by Párraga Niebla, [3], in Section 2.2., namely “receive”, “understand” and “trust”. No
requirements in the category “notice” were considered relevant to the specific
challenges.
Receive. Seven applicable requirements aim to ensure that the population receives
warning messages distributed by authorities. The first requirement refers to using a
multi-channel approach in order to reach all people threatened by a hazard in all
contexts. Several sources concluded that a multi-channel approach increases the
effectiveness of public warning or is less risky as all channels have limitations [4, 5,
14, 21–23]. Further supporting arguments insist on the need for (ubiquitous) coverage
and high penetration of warning technologies [3, 24]. Furthermore, the population
needs to be warned in different contexts, which cannot be reached by the same warning
channels [3, 5, 8, 9]. Also, people’s access to one technology (e.g., their mobile phone
or specific applications) cannot be guaranteed [5, 25]. Brynielsson et al. [26] further
reason that people’s perceptions of source credibility and trust differ, which is another
argument for using different channels to make PWS more effective.
Second, authorities should be able to activate all necessary channels easily and
without issues [4]. Besides, channels and technologies should be compatible [16, 27].
In this context, Párraga Niebla et al. [4] refer to the introduction of the Common
Alerting Protocol (CAP) as an essential step. Fourth, warnings should be sent based on
citizens’ current location (geotargeting) [3, 5, 8, 9, 14], in order to “avoid excessive
panic” [24, p. 154]. Due to this requirement, cell broadcasting might not be an
appropriate technology for large countries, as cells tend to cover large areas [5]. The
fifth requirement relates to warning the population in a timely manner, not only but
also by using appropriate technologies [3, 5, 8, 14, 16, 24, 26, 28]. Lastly, the literature
stresses the need to use highly available [3], reliable and resilient [3, 5], as well as

redundant [16] technologies to prevent failures. For federal countries, Aloudat and
Michael [5] mention the need to establish clear protocols for information dissemination
to ensure the correctness of the destination of the message which also relates to the
trust in concept of trust later mentioned in this section.
Understand. Three distinct requirements aim to ensure that recipients of warning
messages understand them. Firstly, when formulating and sending alerts, authorities
should use a targeted approach by considering different needs and capabilities of the
population, including for example age groups and people with disabilities [8, 27–29].
This also includes the support of (configuring) different presentation modes or multimedia content [3, 8]. Alerts via text messages might, for example, be very beneficial to
deaf and hearing-impaired [5]. Secondly, alerts should be offered in a language
understandable by the population, which implies the need to provide information in
several languages [3, 5, 8]. Lastly, authorities should provide citizens with all or
sufficient relevant information, including where to find further details [3, 4, 8], in a
specific [26] and accurate manner [5].
Trust. Four applicable requirements were assigned to the category of “trust”. Párraga
Niebla [3], Preinersdorfer et al. [16], and Green et al. [30]mention the need for PWS to
include security features. Examples of this can be authentication methods or limiting
web-based access to PWS to prevent manipulation and cybersecurity threats. Further,
it needs to be ensured that an “all-clear” message will be sent using the same
communication channels once the threat is over [14]. Concerning the challenges for
federal countries, Aloudat and Michael [5] note the necessity to ensure consistent
quality at all locations, thus also across state borders. Experts interviewed by Aloudat
and Michael [5] stated that every citizen is entitled to alerts of the same quality, leading
to the need to specify guidelines by a central (national) agency on what that meant.
Furthermore, the authors mention the need to establish clear protocols for information
dissemination to ensure the correctness of the content of the message [5].
Further Requirements. Two federalism-specific requirements do not fall into the
previously introduced categories. Firstly, Aloudat and Michael [5] mention the need for
a common approach to public warning specified by a central (national) agency.
Secondly, inadequate coordination is highlighted as the primary barrier for warning
systems by three authors [3, 12, 13], which supports the call for appropriate governance
structures to mitigate this issue. Preinersdorfer et al. [16] hereby highlight that
structures need to ensure that alerts can be sent from different administrative levels
according to the prevailing disaster management structures.
4.2

Document Analysis and Expert Interview

Following the review of academic literature, further documents, for example, those
published by international organizations, were used to validate the list of requirements.
Additional sources put a specific emphasis on appropriate governance structures and
clear responsibilities as well as standardized procedures and protocols to ensure
effective warning of the population [31–33]. In addition, the European

Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) defines a list of scenarios in which
citizens need to be reached [34]. It widens the definition of citizens at risk, including
those “entering the area or in close proximity to the area during the emergency” [34, p.
9], which specifies the first requirement (see Receive) as derived from academic
literature. One additional requirement, namely, to ensure appropriate training of
warning personnel [32], was added to the list.
Besides, the requirements from the literature were cross-referenced with insight from
the expert interview. Insights from the interview confirmed four requirements that had
previously been identified by other sources: The need to use a multi-channel approach
with technologies that provide attention-calling features, to reach all people at risk in
all contexts and locations. As stated by the interviewee: “In our opinion there is not just
one warning channel […] because every warning channel has some advantages and
disadvantages. The radio is still the most widespread warning multiplier […] the
disadvantage is that you do not wake up when the radio is switched off - you need
something to wake people up with”. The interviewee also emphasized the need to
provide the population with “all clear” messages that “need to be formulated in such a
way that the citizen understands it”.

5

Design Principles

Based on the finalized list of requirements, we developed design principles in the areas
strategy and governance, standards and templates, and technology. The design
principles in the category strategy and governance aim for a common and jointly
developed public warning concept, highlighting essential aspects that have to be
considered and defined. For example, is it important to define clear responsibilities
between federal, state, and local authorities to warn the population on time as well as
with the appropriate means of public warning. However, a lower authority should be
able to send warning messages to a larger territorial area within the same state if
necessary. For this, the authority should receive prior approval from a respectively
higher authority. The design principles in the category standards and templates focus
on guaranteeing every citizen, no matter in which federal state they are located, the
same quality of warning. This can be fulfilled by developing templates and offering
training to responsible authorities. The last feature, technology, focuses on the
implementation of the previously defined changes as well as the provision of the
technologies.
Strategy and Governance. The principles in this category are based on the identified
requirement to ensure a common approach as well as on establishing appropriate
governance structures, including a description of responsibilities. A joint concept of
strategy and governance supports the avoidance of coordination issues during an
emergency between different levels of authorities and means of public warning. The
following principles are defined:
(1) Federal authorities in coordination with state and local authorities work out and
use a common concept to warn the public in case of occurring emergencies.

(2) The concept should consider and define scenarios in which citizens need to be
reached (e.g., at home, at work, outside, in transit, etc.) and assign at least one
technology to each scenario. At least one technology needs to be used across the entire
country, while further technologies can be specified individually by each authority.
(3) The concept should consider and define warning levels as a basis for assigning
responsibilities as well as the choice of public warning means. For each warning level,
it needs to be specified which scenarios need to be covered when sending a warning
message.
(4) The concept should consider and define clear responsibilities based on warning
levels and (territorial) administrative responsibilities. In predefined emergencies,
authorities should be able to warn the population in proximity to but outside their
jurisdiction. In order to reach out to a larger area, the responsible authority 1 should
receive prior approval from the respective higher administrative level.
(5) The concept should consider and define whether and when affected 2 authorities
are allowed to change or adapt a message passed on from the authority responsible for
that disaster.
(6) The concept should consider and define whether responsibilities for warning
messages and all-clear signals can change over the course of a disaster.
Standards and Templates. The design principles listed in the category standards and
templates address the requirement category “understand”, which considers different
needs and capabilities of the population when sending alerts (targeted approach). To
warn the whole country in case of an emergency, it is of high importance that every
person can understand the message (provide information in several languages). The
following principles are defined:
(7) Public warning messages should be based on common standards to ensure equal
quality and understanding of messages for the entire population and avoid delays
despite split responsibilities.
(8) The responsible authorities should jointly agree on standards for each
technology/ means of warning (e.g. protocols for information dissemination) to ensure
equal quality of warning in a timely manner.
(9) The responsible authorities should jointly agree on standards that consider the
needs and capabilities of the population to avoid exclusion of parts of the population.
(10) The responsible authorities should jointly agree on standards which define
templates for warning messages for each means of warning, to provide the same
information to every citizen despite their source of information (e.g., relevant content,
specific and accurate phrasing, languages).
(11) The responsible authorities should jointly agree on standards that define training
guidelines. They should further ensure joint training and workshops to enable an
1

The responsible authority is understood to be the authority responsible for sending out the initial
warning message. The administrative level of the authority might depend on the warning level
of the disaster.
2 The affected authority is understood to be an authority in (close) proximity of the disaster (but
outside the jurisdiction/competence area of the responsible agency) which receives the
warning message and can send it to its citizens.

exchange of experiences among different levels. Thereby, every person in charge is
able to use the provided standards and templates in a correct manner.
Technology. The last category, containing five design principles, addresses the
formerly defined requirements of the category “receive”. It is important that all citizens
are able to receive the same warning message using a centrally provided technology, to
avoid mixed information and late responses to the warning message. The following
principles are defined:
(12) A (national) authority should provide basic infrastructure and interfaces for the
PWS which can be accessed by all authorities involved in public warning. Thereby, it
should be assured that this infrastructure is redundant and protected against failures.
(13) Furthermore, country-wide used technologies should be provided centrally
(e.g., by a national authority or private provider), which allows states and municipalities
to additionally connect further warning technologies. This provides a way to assure
highly available, reliable, and resilient technologies are used.
(14) The technology of the PWS needs to ensure that all relevant scenarios according
to warning levels are covered (e.g., by choice of at least one technology in that category)
when sending a warning message. In each relevant scenario, at least the country-wide
used technology needs to be used, in order to ensure that all people are reached in the
same scenarios despite their location.
(15) Lastly, the responsibilities and access rights should be represented in the PWS
and (16) the PWS should enable to reassign responsibility of a warning message to
other levels in case of changing responsibilities (e.g., “all-clear” message from
authority closest to disaster). The means used for updates of all-clear messages should
not be adaptable over the course of the disaster.

6

Exemplary Case Application: The German Case

In Germany, warning and alerting the population is a task shared between the federal
and state administrations. Whereas the federal administration is responsible for civil
protection, especially in defense situations, the states are responsible for protecting the
population in case of most other disasters [35]. For this purpose, the Federal Office of
Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) operates the Modular Warning System
(MoWaS), which has been used by federal and state authorities since 2013 [36]. It
allows the triggering of all connected warning technologies via a central user interface
[36].
In order to uncover opportunities to further increase the effectiveness of public
warning through MoWaS, the design principles were applied to the German case. Each
principle was individually checked against information collected through the expert
interview, analysis of available documents, and web research. In case the design
principles were not fully adhered to, recommendations based on the design principles
were formulated. In case information was limited due to access restrictions, for
example, regarding higher warning levels, we focused on the parts of the system we did
have information about. The opportunities for improvement were summarized in
Table 1.

Table 1. Opportunities for increasing the effectiveness of MoWaS
#
1

2

3
4

5

Opportunity for improvement
The involved authorities should agree on a comprehensive warning concept which
brings together the information identified in different sources and defines clusters of
technologies (scenarios) as well as the respective, country-wide used technology for
each scenario. Responsibilities and rights should be clearly defined (including, for
example, exceptional situations and the right to warn neighboring municipalities).
The guidelines agreed upon by federal and state governments in 2019 [37] provide
a starting point to include these design recommendations.
Templates should be created for each means of public warning considering the needs
and capabilities of the population. The templates should include (only) the relevant
content and be explicitly phrased and accurately. Templates need to exist in different
languages.
The remaining authorities relevant for public warning from the different
administrative levels should be connected to MoWaS.
It should be ensured that the previously defined country-wide used technologies are
provided centrally for all citizens by public or private organizations, as are, for
example, NINA or KATWARN.
Changes based on the previous recommendations should be reflected in MoWaS, for
example through authorities’ (access) rights and the obligation to choose countrywide used technologies as well as predefined templates for warning messages.
Warning updates should only be possible using the same warning technologies.

It should be noted that the further development of MoWaS is and was the central
concern of a project carried out jointly by federal and state governments. It aims to
finish by the end of 2020 and is funded through the Internal Security Fund (ISF) [38].
Some of the recommendations, such as connecting the remaining authorities to
MoWaS, might therefore already being addressed.
The exemplary application to the German case emphasizes that the proposed design
principles can be a valid approach to assess a PWS in a federal administrative system.
Despite not being able to evaluate all parts of the system due to restricted access to
information, we could still derive recommendations that might be valuable for
improving the effectiveness of MoWaS.

7

Discussion and Conclusion

We have developed a set of design principles in the categories strategy and governance,
standards and templates, and technology that aim to guide through the implementation
of a new PWS in federal administrative systems. Natural and human-made disasters
can affect large areas of an authority’s population. Equally, public warning has become
more critical as a consequence of increasing and exacerbating numbers of incidents
over the past years [28]. Even though technological development and digitalization
have led to an improvement in PWS, administrative and governance structures also play
an essential role in effective public warning, especially in complex systems as
federalism [3, 5, 39].

To achieve the research goal, we conducted a systematic literature review on the
requirements for public warning in federal administrative systems according to Webster
and Watson [18], which detected three challenges of public warning in federal systems:
missing clear responsibilities, lacking coordination, and interoperability. Furthermore,
general requirements of a PWS, as well as federalism-specific requirements, have been
identified. These requirements addressed the categories receive, notice, understand,
trust as well as further requirements outside those categories. Based on the results of
the literature review, the design principles were developed.
7.1

Limitation and further research

Despite basing the research design on proven research approaches, our work is
subject to limitations that emphasize the need for further research. Firstly, the literature
review, especially its manual steps, might be subjective to some extent. It could also be
difficult to distinguish between generally relevant challenges and requirements as well
as those that were only applicable in the case discussed by the authors of the article in
question. Further, the literature review revealed only a limited literature basis for
requirements regarding administrative structures and especially federalism. This fact
was mitigated by consulting further documents in the following steps of the research.
Further research should, thus, aim to extend the literature basis in this field. Due to
the increasing importance of public warning, scholars could, for example, compare the
effectiveness of different public warning systems considering their academic
background. Secondly, even though the basic phases for design-oriented IS research as
proposed by Österle et al. [6] were followed to derive the IT artifact, the design
principles were not finally evaluated by experts. Future research should aim to increase
the involvement of experts in the field of PWS in federalism to verify and test the design
principles, for example through focus groups. As a next step, research could test the
design principles together with experts to investigate and improve its practical
applicability.
Furthermore, part of the information regarding public warning in Germany is
classified, which might have influenced the results of the demonstration. We are also
not the intended addressees of the artifact. As we used only one case for demonstrating
the artifact, we chose a case in which public warning is substantially influenced by the
structures of the federal system [3]. This implies that it might indeed be strongly
affected by the discovered challenges pose a good example for other cases. Scholars
could now investigate the applicability of our design principles in other federal
administrative systems, such as Belgium or Australia. Lastly, due to scope, we decided
to apply only one iteration of Österle et al.’s [6] method. The decision to leave
improvements of the artifact to the following projects, for example, due to the nature
of research, is recognized as legitimate [40]. Even though further iterations might
improve the artifact, it already provides a starting point for further research. It provides
value to both theory and practice. Other researchers can for example use the artifact as
groundwork and contribute to improving it with their own knowledge and experiences.
Most importantly, however, it should be kept in mind that, even though the focus of
our research was solely on PWS, an effective PWS does not necessarily directly lead

to an effective public warning. Citizens need to be appropriately prepared, for example,
by being trained to act upon warning messages [3]. Therefore, future research should
extend the design principles considering the preparation of citizens.
7.2

Theoretical and practical implications

Despite its limitations, we identified key implications for theory and practice which
emerge from our research. Firstly, the literature review contributes to the closure of the
identified research gap regarding effective PWS and federalism and highlighted the
difference in the maturity of the research fields of general public warning (systems) and
public warning in federalism. Secondly, the design principles provide a starting point
for national governments and practitioners in responsible agencies to work with. They
can be used as a basis for discussions with involved parties and draw attention to factors
that are important for effective public warning. A validated set of design principles will
eventually enable federal governments to review their overall warning systems and
discover potentials for improvement. This is especially important considering a
European Union directive that commits member states to have mobile number-based
PWS (or equivalent regarding its effectiveness) in place by 21 June 2022 [41]. While it
influences the choice of warning technologies included in a multi-channel approach for
public warning, it also generally implies the necessity for a review of existing PWS and
used technologies. Thirdly, not only federal governments can benefit from the results
of this paper. As stated by Gregor and Hevner, an “artifact that is presented with a
higher level degree of abstraction can be generalized to other situations” [19, p. 352].
The design principles were kept on a reasonably abstract level; thus, any national
government can use an adapted version of the model as guidance for a review of its
PWS. An essential step of the process was to gather overall requirements for effective
PWS, which can be used as a basis to design an improved system. Lastly, irrespective
of the administrative level, state or local governments can refer to the design principles
to drive bottom-up change, which is especially important as they are close to the citizens
and might be the first to sense when changes in an existing system become necessary.
7.3

Conclusion

All in all, the study contributes to filling a research gap, as well as enabling
governments to identify federal specific areas of improvement in their existing PWS or
guide the introduction of PWS in federal systems. Eventually, this way the use of our
design principles can lead to a more effective public warning system. This might in turn
positively influence the trust of the public in the warning system as well as the
awareness of measures in case of disasters. In the case of Germany, a more effective
public warning system might lead to a more positive connotation of the subject and a
higher acceptance during the next “Warntag” (Warning Day).
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